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Unfair Misuse: How Section 512 of the DMCA Allows Abuse of 
the Copyright Fair Use Doctrine and How to Fix It 
By Joel D. Matteson* 
Hoping to spur the growth of the early Internet, Congress 
passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in 1998. The 
goal was to balance online service providers’ interests in avoiding 
secondary copyright liability based on their users’ online posts with 
Internet users’ interests in maintaining their right to fair use of 
copyrighted material online. Twenty years later, the evidence 
demonstrates that the DMCA has skewed too far towards protecting 
providers of online services at the expense of fair use. This has resulted 
in unnecessary chilling of otherwise protected speech. Specifically, 
under the DMCA, putative copyright holders may immediately force 
down any content they deem to be infringing, regardless of fair use 
considerations. To address this imbalance, Congress should amend § 
512 to eliminate the automatic takedown period so that no material 
comes down until the poster has had a reasonable opportunity to 
present his or her fair use defense.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Consider an upcoming election. The public engages in vigorous 
debate, online and off. Two weeks before the election, someone posts 
snippets of a politician’s manifesto on YouTube to illustrate the 
poster’s commentary. Upset, the politician issues a takedown notice 
to YouTube under § 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(hereinafter, “DMCA”), claiming the video violates his copyright. 
The politician demands that YouTube immediately take the post 
down. The candidate does not provide detailed justification, only self-
serving and conclusory allegations. Even if both the candidate and the 
poster suspect that a judge would likely find the video to be protected 
under copyright’s well-established fair use doctrine,1 the candidate 
does not actually need to worry about whether the posting constitutes 
fair use – at least not for the next ten-to-fourteen days. This is because 
under § 512(g) of the DMCA, the candidate enjoys unprecedented 
power to require Online Service Providers (hereinafter “OSPs”) like 
YouTube to take down the posted material automatically and upon 
demand.2 Under the DMCA, the candidate may force the takedown of 
posted material for at least ten-to-fourteen days, regardless of the 
merits.3 Afraid of losing its safe harbor and of being sued for indirect 
copyright infringement, YouTube takes the video down. In exchange, 
YouTube gains immunity from secondary copyright infringement 
liability.4 This is the DMCA bargain; putative copyright holders 
suddenly become empowered to take down material they disapprove 
based only on an assertion that it violates their copyright. For their 
complicity, OSPs get legal immunity. 
If the poster believes the material he or she posted constitutes 
fair use, the poster may issue a counter notice under § 512(g)(3) 
contesting the takedown. Unfortunately, by operation of DMCA law, 
the video must nevertheless stay offline for ten-to-fourteen days 
notwithstanding the counter notice.5 Ten-to-fourteen days later when 
the mandatory takedown period expires, the material is finally eligible 
                                                          
1 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). See also Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech 
Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: Chilling Effects of the DMCA on the First Amendment, 
24 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 171, 176 (2010). 
2 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(c) (2012). See also Letter from Lateef Mtima & 
Steven D. Jamar, Institute for Intellectual Property & Social Justice, to Karyn Temple Clagg, 
Register of Copyrights, United States Copyright Office 2 (Feb. 21, 2017) (Under the DMCA, 
“rights holders continue to enjoy the unprecedented capability to have content summarily 
removed from the Internet without judicial intervention or assessment of any kind.”) (available 
at https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=COLC-2015-0013-92475). 
3 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(c). 
4 § 512(c). 
5 § 512(g)(2)(c). 
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for reposting. But now the election is over. Reposting is moot. 
Society’s right to engage in this valuable public discussion is forever 
lost. The mandatory ten-to-fourteen day waiting has effectively given 
the politician two weeks of free censorship.6 
In 1998, Congress established the “safe harbor” of § 512 of the 
DMCA.7 The safe harbor shields OSPs from secondary liability for 
copyright infringement for posts made “at the direction of a user” of 
an online service like YouTube, provided the OSP complies with 
certain statutory requirements.8 If the OSP fails to qualify for safe 
harbor protection, copyright infringement and liability are evaluated 
under traditional copyright law. The DMCA makes it clear that failing 
to qualify for a safe harbor does not limit any defenses a service 
provider may have.9 
The safe harbor benefits OSPs by shielding them from secondary 
liability for copyright infringement. It also benefits copyright holders 
by conferring upon them unprecedented power to force down all 
content they allege to be infringing, regardless of whether it actually 
infringes. The DMCA does not, however, adequately protect the 
legitimate interests of posters of online content against the automatic 
ten-to-fourteen day takedown power. This is because, under the 
DMCA, posters of online content are denied basic due process and 
protection for their non-infringing fair uses during this ten-to-fourteen 
day period.  
This article explains how the DMCA fails to sufficiently protect 
users’ rights by infringing on fair use and, consequently, chilling the 
academic, technical, commercial, political, and creative speech that 
makes the Internet so valuable. This article proposes several much-
needed reforms to § 512, the core of which would be the removal of 
the automatic ten-to-fourteen day takedown period. This period 
results in an unnecessary prior restraint on fair use, without proof of 
copyright or a hearing on fair use. Adopting the amendments in this 
article will increase protection for fair use while continuing to protect 
copyright and maintaining OSP immunity from secondary liability for 
copyright infringement.  
                                                          
6 See Corynne McSherry & Kit Walsh, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Comment Letter on 
Section 512 Study 16 (Apr. 1, 2016), 
https://www.eff.org/files/2016/04/01/eff_comments_512_study_4.1.2016.pdf. 
7 See Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, Title II of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 202, 112 Stat. 2860, 2877-86 (1998) (codified at 17 
U.S.C. § 512). 
8 17 U.S.C. § 512. See also Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010), aff'd in part, vacated in part, remanded, 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012).  
9 § 512(l). See also DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT (DMCA): SAFE HARBORS FOR 
ONLINE SERVICE PROVIDERS, PRACTICAL LAW PRACTICE NOTE 1-518-6907, Practical Law (last 
visited on Aug. 27, 2018), https://us.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/1-518-6907 (hereinafter 
“Practice Note”). 
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This article starts by describing the DMCA, including its key 
provisions, legislative history, and policy. From there, the article 
reviews specific examples of DMCA abuse and related chilling 
effects, such as when putative copyright holders illegitimately use the 
DMCA to muffle opposing political viewpoints or takedown well-
meaning videos that happen to include incidental use of copyrighted 
works. This article then proposes much-needed reforms,  
First, targets of DMCA takedown notices must have an 
opportunity to respond before an OSP takes material down based 
upon a DMCA notice.  
Second, OSPs must leave the posted material up and available if 
the user provides an affidavit of noninfringement. 
Third, the definition of “repeat offender” should not include 
users who provide counter notices unless subsequently adjudicated as 
infringers.  
Fourth, infringement complainants should be permitted to 
remove the content violating the copyright only after the poster of the 
content fails to remove the material themselves within a specified 
time of the takedown notice.  
Fifth, unless reviewed by a human, DMCA notices predicated 
solely upon automatic, computer-generated infringement-detection 
devices should be forbidden.  
Finally, this article discusses the negative effect on free speech 
that will persist until Congress reforms the DMCA. 
I. WHY CONGRESS CREATED THE DMCA 
Throughout the 1990s, the Internet was rapidly becoming a 
revolutionary new platform for the dissemination of ideas, speech, 
information, and commerce. Along with this vast new information 
platform came unprecedented challenges to protecting copyright 
online. This was particularly challenging in view of the distributional 
potential of the Internet coupled with copyright’s low bar to 
creation.10 To enjoy copyright protection, one needs only an original 
work of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.11 No 
formalities are required.12 In 1976, the United States made copyright 
registration optional.13 In 1989 it removed the requirement notice.14 In 
                                                          
10 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (requiring only a 
“modicum of creativity” to form a copyright). 
11 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
12 Id. 
13 § 408. 
14 Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2583, 2587 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 401 (2012)).  
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1992, it removed the requirement to renew registration.15 Because a 
copyright is so easy to create, and because the Internet allows mass 
proliferation of content, anyone who uses the Internet frequently 
encounters copyright and related allegations.16   
Developed decades before the Internet, traditional copyright law 
was ill-equipped to handle online piracy. Because it was difficult to 
stop infringement at the individual level, the alternative under 
traditional copyright law was to direct claims against OSPs under a 
theory of secondary liability for providing the online venue.17  
But holding OSPs responsible for the infringing acts of their 
users would only slow the development of the Internet. Faced with 
liability for their users’ infringing acts, OSPs would stop providing 
services.18 Imposing on OSPs a “filter-everything” approach would 
chill online services.19 Thus, the DMCA was organized around the 
goal of “provid[ing] greater certainty to service providers concerning 
their legal exposure for infringements that may occur in the course of 
their activities.”20 The law’s authors stated, “by limiting the liability 
of [OSPs], the DMCA ensures that the efficiency of the Internet will 
continue to improve and that the variety and quality of services on the 
Internet will continue to expand.”21 The legislative intent behind the 
safe harbor was to facilitate “the robust development and world-wide 
expansion of electronic commerce, communications, research, 
development, and education.”22 Congress hoped that by limiting OSP 
copyright infringement liability, the efficiency and utility of the 
Internet would continue to improve and expand.23 Therefore, “without 
clarification of their liability, service providers [would] hesitate to 
                                                          
15 Copyright Amendments Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264, 266 (codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 304(a), 408 (2012)). 
16 See Maria A. Pallante, The Curious Case of Copyright Formalities, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1415, 1416 (2013). 
17 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
18 See McSherry & Walsh, supra note 6, at 2. 
19 See Elliot Harmon, “Notice-and-Stay-Down” Is Really Filter Everything, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/01/notice-and-stay-
down-really-filter-everything. 
20 S. REP. NO. 105-190 (1998) at 20, 40 (The DMCA was intended to “protect qualifying service 
providers from liability for all monetary relief for direct, vicarious and contributory 
infringement.”); H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 105–796, at 72-73 (1998), 1998 U.S.S.C.A.N. 639, 649-
550; H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 105–796 (1998); H.R. REP. NO. 105–551, pt. 2, at 50 (1998). 
21 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8. 
22 Id. at 1–2. 
23 Id. at 8. (“It’s hard to overstate the importance of the DMCA’s safe harbor provision to the 
growth of the early Internet. Had providers and platforms faced liability for what users 
published, far fewer social networks and web hosts would have existed because of the legal risk. 
Those that did exist would have had to carefully screen what users posted to ensure no copyright 
violations were taking place.”). See also Klint Finley, The Internet’s Safe Harbor Just Got A 
Little Less Safe, WIRED (Aug. 17, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/08/internets-
safe-harbor-just-got-little-less-safe/. 
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make the necessary investment in the expansion of the speed and 
capacity of the Internet.”24  
Any remaining OSPs would tend to censor material instead of 
allowing the free and open discussion that makes the Internet so 
valuable.25 Congress, therefore, needed a law that not only bolstered 
copyright protection online, but also provided OSPs with immunity 
against liability for secondary infringement. 
As the DMCA was being debated in Washington, OSPs and 
copyright holders lobbied intensely for more protection. Copyright 
was safer, they argued, if the copyright claimant could, with the click 
of a mouse, remove allegedly infringing content. Such concerns about 
protecting copyright while not chilling the burgeoning Internet 
overshadowed users’ legitimate interest in not being subject to prior 
restraints and in being able to present the defenses of fair use and 
uncopyrightable subject matter before their speech was silenced.  
To serve this purpose, the law has historically recognized two 
important boundaries around copyright. These boundaries were 
developed over centuries to protect fair use and speech by limiting the 
power of copyright.26 The first boundary, codified in § 102(b) of the 
Copyright Act, limits the scope of copyright to expression, not the 
underlying idea.27 This idea/expression dichotomy holds: “In no case 
does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to 
any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principal, or discovery….”28 Implicit in the idea-expression 
dichotomy is the recognition that monopolies on the mind, ideas, and 
speech, while sometimes good for a few, are often bad for many. 
The second boundary is copyright’s fair use doctrine.29 Under 
the fair use doctrine, copying without permission is not an 
infringement if it is for a limited, transformative purpose, including 
                                                          
24 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8. 
25 See Laura Sydell, Why Taylor Swift Is Asking Congress To Update Copyright Laws, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Aug. 8, 2016, 4:33 PM ET), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/08/08/487291905/why-taylor-swift-is-
asking-congress-to-update-copyright-laws (“[I]f Congress made Internet companies responsible 
for finding and taking down unauthorized music files, they would begin to err heavily on the 
side of caution and censor musicians out of fear that their music might violate the copyright 
laws and the company would be responsible for millions of dollars in fines.”). 
26 See generally Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas – … the best test of truth is 
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market....”). See also Jon 
M. Garon, Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright Philosophy and 
Ethics, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1278, 1301 (2003) (“Anointing the author's relationship with his 
work as essential and unrestricted stands in diametric opposition to the open marketplace of 
ideas idealized in the United States.”). 
27 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). 
28 Id. 
29 E.g., Ned Snow, Proving Fair Use: Burden of Proof as Burden of Speech, 31 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1781, 1793 (2010). 
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commentary, criticism, or parody.30 Fair use is essential to the 
equitable, balanced, and proper administration of copyright law.31 The 
fair use doctrine provides an important exception to the general rule 
that only the holder of a copyrighted work may copy, distribute, make 
derivative works, or publicly perform or display a copyrighted 
work.32 The fair use doctrine is vital to U.S. copyright law.33 It 
provides the necessary “breathing space” for expression and promotes 
the dissemination of ideas and speech, which furthers copyright’s 
ultimate purpose.34 It does this by expressly permitting the use of 
copyrighted works by someone other than the rights holder to 
disseminate ideas, critique, parody, criticism, education, and scientific 
discourse.35  
Taking away the defense of fair use by allowing for automatic 
DMCA takedowns, even for ten-to-fourteen days, over-extends 
copyright, chills speech, and prematurely, sometimes without cause, 
deprives the public of a valuable exchange of ideas.36 Besides tearing 
down important boundaries around copyright, the DMCA’s takedown 
regime empowers censorship by shifting the burden of proof away 
from the plaintiff and onto the accused.37 This is significant because 
whoever bears the burden of proof wins the tie-breaker case.38 Not 
only does it shift the burden of proof, the DMCA dramatically alters 
the timing of the presentation of valid defenses to copyright 
infringement until after the speech has been disabled. It transfers the 
cost of responding or filing suit for declaratory relief onto the poster, 
which can become an insurmountable burden for many.39 
II. WHAT CONGRESS CREATED: THE DMCA UP CLOSE 
Concern about online copyright piracy culminated in Congress’ 
passage of the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation 
Act in 1998, now known as § 512 of the DMCA.40  
The DMCA takedown process works like this: a putative 
copyright holder observes speech online that he or she wants taken 
                                                          
30 § 107. 
31 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219, 221 (2003) (describing fair use as a “free speech 
safeguard[]” and a “First Amendment accommodation[].”). 
32 § 107. 
33 See Lydia Pallas Loren, Fair Use: An Affirmative Defense?, 90 WASH. L. REV. 685, 686 
(2015). 
34 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
35 § 107. 
36 See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2004). 
37 See Snow, supra note 29 (discussing the chilling effect on speech of placing the burden of 
proof on the party claiming fair use). 
38 See Loren, supra note 33, at 704. 
39 See Seltzer, supra note 1, at 177. 
4017 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).  
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down. This complainant sends a written takedown notice to the OSP 
that hosts the material (the OSP is required to list an agent for receipt 
of such notices under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2)). The accuser meets a 
few simple statutory requirements, including that the accuser claims a 
good faith belief that the target is infringing.41  
After receiving the takedown notice, the OSP must either take 
the material down for at least ten-to-fourteen days – regardless of 
whether the material actually infringes on any copyright – or lose 
immunity against secondary copyright liability.42 If the OSP values its 
enterprise’s legal immunity over an individual poster’s free speech or 
fair use, the material comes down.  
However, § 512 was intended to create a system of checks and 
balances to allow removal of infringing content while preserving 
legitimate content.43 To that end, the DMCA system established four 
separate safe harbors to protect eligible OSPs from liability for 
copyright infringement based on actions by users of their services.44  
The Transmission Safe Harbor covers services involving transmitted, 
routed, or provided connections (for example, telephone lines) for 
digital online connections for infringing material transmitted by 
users.45 Material on a system or network where the material is initially 
made available by someone else is subject to the Caching Safe 
Harbor.46 The Storage Safe Harbor, which is the principal subject of 
this article, involves material hosted, stored or made and “at the 
direction of users.”47 Finally, the Search Engine or Information 
Location Tools Safe Harbor concerns links or referrals of users to 
online locations containing infringing matter or activity.48  
The DMCA defines OSPs two ways. First, as “an entity offering 
the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital 
online communications, between or among points specified by a user, 
of material of the user’s choosing, without modification to the content 
of the material as sent or received.”49 Second, the DMCA defines an 
OSP as “a provider of online services or network access, or the 
operator of facilities therefor.”50 
To be eligible for protection under the Safe Harbor, OSPs must 
designate an agent for service of take-down notices.51 OSPs must 
                                                          
41 Id. § 512(c)(3); id.§ 512(g).  
42 Id. § 512(g)(2)(c). 
43 See Practice Note, supra note 9. 
44 § 512(a)-(d); Practice Note, supra note 9.  
45 Id. § 512(a). 
46 Id. § 512(b). 
47 Id. § 512(c). 
48 Id. § 512(d). 
49 Id. § 512(k)(1)(A). 
50 Id. § 512(k)(1)(B). 
51 Id. § 512(c)(2) (“An agent to receive notifications of claimed infringement.”). 
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provide agent contact information on both its websites and to the 
Copyright Office.52 OSPs must write, adopt, and post online a repeat 
infringer policy.53 OSPs must manage the take-down-notice process 
and respond expeditiously to statutorily-compliant takedown 
requests.54 OSPs must reasonably implement a repeat-infringer 
policy. OSPs are ineligible for safe harbor protection if they benefit 
financially from infringing posts for which they have direction and 
control.55 Finally, OSPs must lack actual knowledge of infringement 
or awareness of facts and circumstances (“red flags”) making 
infringement apparent.56 What constitutes “knowledge” has been the 
subject of much litigation. The general rule that has emerged is that, 
to hold an OSP secondarily liable for infringing posts of its users, 
general knowledge of possible infringement is not enough. Instead, 
the OSP must have specific knowledge of particular instances of 
infringing activity.57 As long as the OSP lacks such specific 
knowledge, it may avail itself of the DMCA safe harbor.58 
In drafting the safe harbor, Congress was careful to alleviate 
OSPs from having to monitor their websites for potentially infringing 
activity. Under § 512(m)(1), an OSP has no affirmative duty to 
monitor for or seek out possible infringements to be eligible for safe 
harbors.59 In Perfect 10 Inc. v. CCBill LLC, for example, the court 
observed, “Were we to require service providers to terminate users 
under circumstances other than those specified in § 512(c), § 512(c)’s 
grant of immunity would be meaningless,” as service providers would 
then need to assume the additional burden of removing users, which 
the DMCA was designed to ameliorate.60 
Throughout Congress’ deliberations, protecting OSPs and 
copyright was the overriding agenda. Users’ interests in fair use were 
overshadowed by comparison. This is reflected in the fact that users’ 
only recourse under the DMCA is to file a “counter notice.” This 
right, however, is very limited and ultimately ineffective because it 
occurs only after posted material is disabled and removed. It does 
nothing to prevent the core problem of automatic takedown of 
material for ten-to-fourteen days. Under the DMCA, if a user 
provides a counter notice, the OSP may decide whether to re-post the 
                                                          
52 Id. 
53 Id. § 512(i)(1)(A). 
54 Id. § 512(c)(1)(C). 
55 Id. § 512(c). 
56 Id. § 512(c)(1)(A). 
57 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1021 (9th Cir. 2013). 
58 Id. at 1021. 
59 § 512(m)(1). 
60 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2007); see also H.R. REP. NO. 
105–551, pt. 2, 61 (1998) (“Section 512(i) is not intended “to undermine the ... knowledge 
standard of [§ 512](c).”). 
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material, but nothing in the statute requires reposting. In fact, OSPs 
often lack incentives to repost. Even if an OSP wants to repost, it 
cannot do so less than ten days after receiving a counter notice 
without losing immunity under the safe harbor.  
Making matters worse, under the DMCA, users are not entitled 
to notice of the ex parte takedown until after it occurs.61 Thus, users 
are not entitled to present either a fair use defense or the defense of 
uncopyrightable subject matter or thin copyright before the material 
comes down. This is because Congress failed to extend the fair use 
and uncopyrightable subject matter defenses to the critical ten-to-
fourteen-day automatic DMCA takedown regime. Without these 
protections, too many OSPs have abused the DMCA takedown power 
and too much legitimate speech has been removed. 
III.  THE PROBLEM: WIDESPREAD DMCA ABUSES 
In 2007, Stephanie Lenz, a stay-at-home mother, uploaded a 
brief video on YouTube of her dancing toddler. For less than thirty-
seconds, Prince’s song, “Let’s Go Crazy,” played audibly in the 
background. Although there was no hint of commercial use or 
infringement – Stephanie was simply sharing with friends and 
followers – Universal Musical Corporation, Prince’s publishing 
administrator responsible for enforcing his copyrights, issued a 
takedown notice. YouTube summarily removed the video. Stephanie 
filed a counter notice under § 512(g) before filing for declaratory 
relief in federal district court. Stephanie sought relief under § 512(f) 
for knowing misrepresentation of allegations of infringement under 
the DMCA. Ruling in Stephanie’s favor, the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of California held that Stephanie’s 
video was fair use.62 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, declaring that “Fair 
use is not just excused by the law, it is wholly authorized by the 
law.”63 The Ninth Circuit declared that putative copyright holders 
have a “duty to consider – in good faith and prior to sending a 
takedown notification – whether allegedly infringing material 
constitutes fair use.”64  
While the Lenz decision sounds encouraging, the decision is 
difficult to enforce because the user must somehow prove bad faith or 
willful blindness on the part of the DMCA complainant.65 This is 
unworkable for people like Stephanie. By the court’s own admission, 
the Lenz standard sets a low bar for plaintiffs to overcome with 
                                                          
61 § 512(g)(2)(A). 
62 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2016). 
63 Id. at 1151. 
64 Id. at 1157. 
65 § 512(c)(3)(A)(v); id. § 512(f). 
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respect to establishing their subjective good faith: 
“Though Lenz argues Universal should have known the video 
qualifies for fair use as a matter of law, we have already decided a 
copyright holder need only form a subjective good faith belief that a 
use is not authorized.”66 The copyright holder is the party forming the 
subjective intent; therefore, that party is in a privileged position to 
declare whether or not that subjective state of mind has been met. The 
Lenz court continued: “If, however, a copyright holder forms a 
subjective good faith belief the allegedly infringing material does not 
constitute fair use, we are in no position to dispute the copyright 
holder’s belief even if we would have reached the opposite 
conclusion.”67 If the court cannot dispute the copyright claimant’s 
subjective mental state, are targets such as Stephanie any better off? 
Moreover, in a recent Federal Case in New York, the court 
rejected a DMCA target’s § 512(f) misrepresentation claim, holding 
that the copyright holder did have a good faith subjective belief.68 The 
court ruled that once the putative copyright holder alleges good faith, 
the onus is on the target to disprove that mental state.69 There, the 
target “failed to proffer any evidence that suggests defendants lacked 
a subjective ‘good faith belief,’ and therefore . . . failed to create a 
triable issue.”70   
It is not clear whether other courts will adopt the Lenz approach 
and require – at least in theory – that the copyright holder consider 
fair use or, alternately, whether courts will follow the precedent in 
Hosseinzadeh and require the target somehow prove the 
complainant’s bad faith.  
At least one court has refused to apply the Lenz rule altogether. 
In Tuteur v. Crosley-Corcoran, the US District Court for the District 
of Massachusetts declined to follow the earlier district court decision 
in Lenz, which held that a copyright holder must consider fair use, 
holding, on the contrary, that “the DMCA did not require a notice-
giver verify that he or she has explored an alleged infringer’s possible 
affirmative defenses prior to acting….”71 The risk of other courts not 
following Lenz is legitimate considering that Congress, in enacting 
the DMCA, did not require a sender of a takedown notice to verify 
                                                          
66 Lenz, 815 F.3d at 1153 (citing Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. Inc., 391 F.3d 1000 (9th 
Cir.2004)); see also § 512(c)(3)(A)(v). 
67 Lenz, 815 F.3d at 1154. 
68 Hosseinzadeh v. Klein, 276 F. Supp. 3d 34, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). 
69 Id. at 47.  
70 Id.  
71 Tuteur v. Crosley-Corcoran, 961 F.Supp.2d 333, 343-44 (D. Mass. 2013). 
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the existence or lack of fair use, only to affirm a good faith belief that 
the copyrighted material is being used without permission.72  
Thus, even though § 512(f) – in theory – renders a copyright 
claimant liable for damages for bad faith allegations, all that the 
DMCA requires to avoid such liability is to produce a mere self-
serving allegation of good faith under § 512(c)(3)(A)(v). For the 
target of a DMCA takedown, holding the putative copyright holder to 
a bad-faith standard is too difficult because it requires proving a 
subjective mental state. 
In another high-profile instance of DMCA abuse, just weeks 
before the 2008 election, several political advertisements from the 
McCain campaign were abruptly taken down due to a DMCA notice. 
This notice was perpetrated by various news and television companies 
alleging the ads infringed their copyrighted television programs.73 
The McCain campaign responded to YouTube in vain: 
 
We write … to alert you to a problem that has already 
chilled this free and uninhibited discourse ….  
[O]verreaching copyright claims have resulted in the 
removal of non-infringing campaign videos from 
YouTube, thus silencing political speech …. [O]ur 
advertisements or web videos have been the subject of 
[Digital Millennium Copyright Act] takedown notices 
regarding uses that are clearly privileged under the fair 
use doctrine. The uses at issue have been the inclusion of 
fewer than ten seconds of footage from news broadcasts 
in campaign ads or videos, as a basis for commentary on 
the issues presented in the news reports, or on the reports 
themselves.74  
 
YouTube responded by pointing out that the DCMA tied its 
hands. If it wanted to maintain its immunity, YouTube explained, it 
had to take the material down for at least ten-to-fourteen days, 
regardless of the merits.75 
                                                          
72 D. MASS WEIGHS IN ON DMCA GOOD FAITH BELIEF REQUIREMENT FOR TAKEDOWN 
NOTICES, PRACTICAL LAW LEGAL UPDATE 4-541-8345, Practical Law (Sep. 17, 2013), 
https://us.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/4-541-8345. 
73 See Seltzer, supra note 1, at 172. 
74 Letter from Trevor Potter, Gen. Counsel, McCain-Palin 2008, to Chad Hurley, CEO, 
YouTube, et al. (Oct. 13, 2008) (available at https://perma.cc/C8AR-4XZ5).   
75 Letter from Zahava Levine, Chief Counsel, YouTube, to Trevor Potter, Gen. Counsel, 
McCain-Palin 2008, at 2-3 (Oct. 14, 2008) (available at 
https://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/youtube-letter-20080514.pdf) (“We try to be careful not 
to favor one category of content on our site over others, and to treat all of our users fairly …. ”). 
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The Obama campaign suffered a similar indignity.76 In that 
instance, the rightsholder, NBC, insisted that the Obama campaign 
cease distributing an advertisement titled, “Bad News,” that dissuaded 
voting for McCain. NBC reasoned that it had not been consulted and 
the video briefly showed images of reporter, Tom Brokaw, then in the 
employ of NBC.77 
News organizations repeatedly misuse the DMCA takedown 
process to target political ads containing fair use material, such as 
brief media clips. For instance, BMG Rights Management issued a 
takedown notice targeting an official Romney campaign ad that 
showed President Obama singing a line from Al Green’s song, “Let’s 
Stay Together.”78 The political clip was not about commercializing Al 
Green’s song. Its purpose was purely political, but it came down 
anyway because, under the DMCA, the underlying merits are 
irrelevant during the ten-to-fourteen day automatic takedown period. 
In another widely publicized instance of DMCA abuse, radio 
host Rush Limbaugh sent a DMCA takedown notice to YouTube 
demanding removal of a montage of Limbaugh’s “most vile 
smears.”79 The footage was arguably embarrassing to Limbaugh and 
the DMCA provided the means to disable access to the material. 
Artist Johnathan McIntosh made a transformative remix video, Buffy 
v. Edward: Twilight Remixed.80 The clearly transformative video did 
not, however, stop Lionsgate from issuing a takedown notice. Facing 
public outcry, Lionsgate relented, but not before much disruption and 
waste.81 Public outrage forced Lionsgate to back off, but many 
takedowns take place in the “shadows of the law” where they are not 
subject to public censure.82  
Film critic, Kevin B. Lee, had his entire YouTube account 
suspended due to DMCA takedown notices. Why? Because Lee used 
                                                          
76 See Steve McClellan, YouTube Pulls Obama Spot, ADWEEK (Oct. 1, 2008), 
https://www.adweek.com/brand-marketing/youtube-pulls-obama-spot-97103/. 
77 Id. 
78 See Timothy Lee, Music Publisher Uses DMCA to Take Down Romney Ad of Obama 
Crooning, ARS TECHNICA (July 16, 2012, 4:59 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2012/07/major-label-uses-dmca-to-take-down-romney-ad-of-obama-crooning/. 
79 See Markos Moulitsas, Rush Limbaugh Demands YouTube Remove Daily Kos Video … Watch 
It Here, DAILY KOS (Apr. 23, 2012, 2:04 PM), 
https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2012/4/23/1085791/-Rush-Limbaugh-demands-YouTube-
remove-Daily-Kos-video-watch-it-here. 
80 See Jonathan McIntosh, “Buffy v. Edward” Remix Unfairly Removed by Lionsgate, ARS 
TECHNICA (Jan. 9, 2013, 7:40 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/01/buffy-vs-
edward-remix-unfairly-removed-by-lionsgate/. 
81 Id. 
82 Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The 
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950 (1979) (describing the realm of extrajudicial negotiations 
and dealings as the “shadow of the law”). 
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brief clips of films in his reviews.83 This was quintessential fair use.  
Yet, nothing in the DMCA prevents any complainant from having a 
post automatically taken down before the poster even receives notice 
of the allegations. 
Companies also misuse the DMCA to engage in “rent-seeking” 
behavior where the DMCA takedown power becomes leverage to a 
payoff arrangement.84  
Complementing the anecdotal evidence, empirical studies also 
confirm widespread DMCA abuse.85 One report described how 
DMCA complaintants issued takedown notices to remove legitimate 
political ads without considering fair use.86 This resulted in removal 
and chilling of Constitutionally-protected political speech. One study 
concluded that “[s]ervice providers have confirmed that unfounded 
DMCA notices are common and significantly burdensome.”87 
An empirical study of DMCA takedowns uncovers a 
“surprisingly high incidence of flawed takedowns.”88 DMCA 
takedown notices involving uncopyrightable subject matter and fair 
use represented 30% of the takedown notices studied.89 Considering 
the millions of takedown notices sent each year, the amount of lawful 
speech implicated is staggering. With respect to the DMCA, the 
speech at issue tends to be speech lawfully made under the fair use 
doctrine since § 512 primarily affects copyright.  
Yet, flawed DMCA takedowns are not subject to judicial review 
and no allowance is made for fair use or uncopyrightable subject 
matter, defenses that are fundamental to copyright law.90 Empirical 
data shows that 57% of the takedown notices to Google are from 
companies demanding the take down of material posted by 
competitors.91 Over a third (37%) of the take down notices are from 
                                                          
83 See Matt Zoller Seitz, Copy Rites: YouTube v. Kevin B. Lee, SLANT (Jan. 13, 2009), 
https://www.slantmagazine.com/house/article/copy-rites-youtube-vs-kevin-b-lee. 
84 See Josh Tabish, The Copyright Barons Are Coming. Now’s the Time to Stop Them, WIRED 
(Jan. 31, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/01/copyright-barons-coming-nows-
time-stop/ (“Increased fortification of copyright amounts to nothing more than ‘rent-seeking’ by 
powerful companies that are less interested in supporting creative communities than in 
maximizing their profit margins.”). 
85 See generally Mtima & Jamar, supra note 2, at 1-2. 
86 See CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY, CAMPAIGN TAKEDOWN TROUBLES: HOW 
MERITLESS COPYRIGHT CLAIMS THREATEN ONLINE POLITICAL SPEECH 4-9 (Oct. 2010), 
https://cdt.org/files/pdfs/copyright_takedowns.pdf. 
87 McSherry & Walsh, supra 6, at 12. 
88 JENNIFER M. URBAN & LAURA QUILTER, EFFICIENT PROCESS OR “CHILLING EFFECTS”? 
TAKEDOWN NOTICES UNDER SECTION 512 OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT 2 
(2005) (summary report) (available at 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Chilling_Effects_Report.pdf). 
89 Id. at 2.  
90 See e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-46 (1991) (describing 
the “fundamental axiom” that copyright law does not protect underlying facts). 
91 Urban & Quilter, supra note 88, at 2. 
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foreign companies.92 An Electronic Frontier Foundation study of the 
DMCA concluded: “If even a small percentage of the millions of 
takedown notices sent each year are improper, that percentage still 
represents a significant swath of lawful speech.”93  
IV. THE SOLUTION—REFORMING THE DMCA 
Experience demonstrates that the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown 
regime actually creates two standards of intellectual property 
protection: one for offline speech, where stronger due process 
considerations require that copyright complainants support their 
contentions with evidence before disabling speech, and another for 
online speech, where prior restraints apply, and evidence is 
inapposite.  
The DMCA needs recalibration. As it stands, it wields a hatchet 
where a scalpel is needed. It creates a bright-line rule that is 
inappropriate for fair use, where, instead, a careful, nuanced, and 
case-by-case approach is required.94 Recognizing this, the Supreme 
Court observed, “The task [of fair use analysis] is not to be simplified 
with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, 
calls for case-by-case analysis.”95  
To address these concerns, this article proposes five reforms. 
First, users should be entitled to advanced notice of takedown 
demands so they may respond before their speech is removed.96 
Studies conclude that the counter-notification process is simply not 
effective at addressing false and mistaken assertions of 
infringement.97 For one, any counter notice is not effective for at least 
ten-to-fourteen days, meaning an OSP could suppress content absent 
justification or substantive inquiry for the term imposed by statute.98 
This contradicts the longstanding disfavor of prior restraints. The 
DMCA operates like a prior restraint because it imposes a limit on 
speech, such as fair use, before any hearing on the merits. This allows 
for private, extra-judicial disposition of speech in the “shadows of the 
law.”99  
Defenders of the DMCA status quo argue that users are afforded 
due process via the limited counter notice provision, but users have 
                                                          
92 Id. at 2. 
93 McSherry & Walsh, supra note 6, at 12. 
94 See e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). 
95 Id. at 577 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 560 
(1985)). 
96 See generally, McSherry & Walsh, supra note 6, at 16.  
97 See Urban & Quilter, supra note 88, at 14-15. 
98 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (2012); Id. § 512(g)(2)(C). 
99 Cf. Mnookin & Kornhausert, supra note 82, at 673 (describing the need for a better system of 
norms to reach reasonable results in bargaining and negotiations outside the courtroom). 
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no right to submit a counter notice before the material is taken down. 
In fact, they don’t even have the right to know about the process until 
after the material is removed. And even if the user has a legally-
recognizable defense, such as fair use, and timely submits a counter 
notice, the posts are still automatically taken down for at least ten-to-
fourteen days.  
Therefore, as the second method of reform, this article proposes 
amending the DMCA to remove the automatic right to take down 
disputed material on demand if the user providers a sworn affidavit of 
non-infringement. Under the third reform posited in this article, if the 
target does not respond, the material ultimately comes down. But the 
burden of proof belongs back on the claimant instead of the accused. 
Under a properly-reformed DMCA, an aggrieved copyright 
complainant may still use the OSP to transmit a takedown demand, 
but that complainant may not force the material down absent either an 
agreement or a judicial order.  
Contrast this with the current version of DMCA, where the 
copyright complainant can force the material down simply by 
providing a takedown notice wherein the alleged copyright holder 
states that she has a good faith belief that there is no legal basis for 
the use of the allegedly infringing materials.100 Giving the 
complainant such broad power of prior restraint based on mere 
allegation means protected speech is vulnerable to shutdown despite a 
total lack of evidence of infringement and without regard to whether 
the complainant even has a valid copyright.101 Instead, the material 
should stay up if the poster makes a sworn statement that he or she 
has a legal basis for posting the material. From there, the complainant 
may still have her day in court, but she may not abuse the DMCA to 
circumvent otherwise applicable law, such as the doctrine of fair use. 
Abuse of posters’ rights, such as fair use, does not go away after 
the automatic takedown period expires. The material remains down 
because OSPs often lack incentive to repost the material: “If put-back 
is not occurring in the appropriate circumstances, the process 
becomes more akin to an extra-judicial injunction than a [temporary 
restraining order (TRO)] – a dramatic realignment of traditional legal 
procedures that protect defendants.”102 Without a pro-fair use default 
rule, “[m]any persons, rather than undertake the considerable burden 
(and sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights through case-by-case 
litigation, will choose simply to abstain from protected activity (such 
as posting fair use material online) – harming not only themselves but 
society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace 
                                                          
100 § 512(c)(3)(A)(v). 
101 See Urban & Quilter, supra note 88, at 5. 
102 Id. at 5. 
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of ideas.”103 Consequently, “the censor’s determination may in 
practice be final.”104  
Moreover, a law such as the DMCA, making lawful activity 
such as fair use posts subject to automatic takedown, tips toward self-
censorship. When too much burden is placed on the poster, self-
censorship results.105  
This article also maintains that concerns about the removal of 
the on-demand, ten-to-fourteen-day period are overstated. For 
example, if a complainant issues a takedown notice to a blatant 
infringer, such as one who reposts an entire copyrighted movie, that 
infringer, caught red-handed, has little incentive to contest a costly 
and losing case. Further, if that user does not respond with a good 
faith affidavit of non-infringement, under the proposed reform, that 
material may still be disabled. In other words, under the revisions this 
article espouses, infringing material may come down, just not 
immediately or automatically. In clear-cut infringement cases, the 
material still comes down because obvious infringers are less likely to 
file bad faith affidavits of non-infringement. If they do, and lose any 
subsequent litigation, penalties may apply. Therefore, Congress 
should adopt enhanced penalties to discourage frivolous affidavits of 
non-infringement.  
To limit abuse of the poster’s use of the affidavit of non-
infringement, the DMCA should be amended to provide for punitive 
damages to the copyright complainant who prevails in court despite 
receiving an affidavit of non-infringement made in bad faith.  
For the fourth proposed reform, the DMCA term “repeat 
offender” should be redrafted to include only those who have been 
adjudicated as copyright infringers more than once.106 This is 
important because if an OSP deems someone to be a repeat infringer, 
the OSP may ban that individual from using the online service to 
engage in lawful expression, such as under the fair use doctrine. Thus, 
such a ban should only take effect after a proceeding on the merits. 
Studying the impact that repeat infringer provisions of § 
512(a)(A) has on speech and fair use, the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation finds serious Constitutional issues.107 Accusations of 
alleged infringement carry drastic consequences: “A user could have 
                                                          
103 Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003). 
104 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965). 
105 See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) (“The man who knows that he must 
bring forth proof and persuade another of the lawfulness of his conduct necessarily must steer 
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106 See David Nimmer, Repeat Infringers, 52 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 167, 196-97 (2005). 
107 See McSherry & Walsh, supra note 6, at 17-18. 
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content removed, or may have her access terminated entirely,” 
without basis in fact or law.108 
This paper further proposes that after receiving an affidavit of non-
infringement from a user, OSPs must continue to be allowed to 
maintain their safe harbor immunity, even if they do not take the 
accused material down.  
Fifth, no takedown should issue if based solely upon an 
automatic, computer-generated infringement detection device unless 
subsequently reviewed by a human. Under this reform, copyright 
holders may still use automated infringement takedown devices, they 
would just need someone to review the flag before issuing a DMCA 
takedown notice. This is because when unverified automated process 
generates DMCA notices, overbroad takedowns occur. A web crawler 
constitutes such an automatic infringement detection device. 
Copyright holders routinely use these devices to scour the Internet for 
potential infringement. These devices’ primary benefit comes from 
their ability to cover ground quickly. They are, however, rather poor 
at evaluating images in context or weighing fair use or policy 
arguments. For example, in one infamous case from 2003, the 
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) sent a DMCA 
notice to Penn State’s Department of Astronomy and Astrophysics.109 
The RIAA accused the university of violating its copyright to songs 
by the musician Usher. The RIAA’s automated detection device 
mistakenly identified the musician Usher with Penn State’s faculty 
member, Peter Usher, and his a cappella astronomy-themed song 
about gamma rays.110 While web crawlers should continue to be 
permissible, humans should review the results before basing any 
DMCA takedown notice on them. 
V. DMCA AND FREE SPEECH 
The DMCA raises concerns not only about copyright law and 
fair use, but also about free speech. Under longstanding First 
Amendment law, generally speech may not be silenced without a 
hearing where evidence is presented and where the speaker enjoys 
due process in terms of advance notice of an adversarial proceeding 
and an opportunity to be heard during that hearing111.  
                                                          
108 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBilll LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1112 (2007). 
109 See Declan McCullagh, RIAA Apologizes for Threatening Letter, CNET News (May 13, 
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This is true offline, where the presumption favors speech, and 
where prior restraints are, as a general matter, presumptively 
unconstitutional.112 But online, under the DMCA, these rules no 
longer apply. Online, a copyright complainant may remove posted 
material (or “speech”) on demand, without proof or a hearing. The 
speaker has no right to advance notice of any adversarial takedown 
notice regarding online posts under the DMCA. Those who speak 
online through an OSP cannot stop the takedown during the first ten-
to-fourteen days based on any valid defense, such as fair use, 
uncopyrightable subject matter, or thin copyright (where the 
copyright is very narrow). Only after an OSP takes a post down due 
to a DMCA takedown notice must it notify the user via an email 
stating, “Your video has been removed due to a copyright 
complaint.”113 
DMCA abuse is particularly concerning in light of the centrality 
of the Internet to modern-day discourse. Every important debate, 
every major event, every new insight is expressed through the 
Internet. Indeed, in drafting the DMCA, Congress observed that 
“[t]he rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive 
computer services available to Americans represent an extraordinary 
advance in availability of educational and informational resources to 
our citizens.”114 Laws regulating online posts, therefore, function as 
laws permitting whether knowledge, information, and speech will 
receive the same level of protection in cyberspace as offline. In Board 
of Education v. Pico, for instance, the Supreme Court acknowledged 
this, concluding that access to information “follows ineluctably from 
the sender’s First Amendment right” and “is a necessary predicate to 
the recipient’s meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, 
and political freedom.”115  
The United Nations Report of the Special Rapporteur noted, 
“[B]y acting as a catalyst for individuals to exercise their right to 
freedom of opinion and expression, the Internet also facilitates the 
realization of a range of other human rights.”116 The issue of Internet 
access and speech is, therefore, more broadly, an issue about human 
rights – specifically, the right to information.  
The Internet has become even more integral now than when 
Congress created the DMCA in 1998. According to recent Pew 
Research, two-thirds of Americans believe “that lacking a home 
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[broadband Internet] subscription is a major disadvantage when it 
comes to accessing government services, searching for employment, 
following the news, learning new things, or getting health 
information.”117 Therefore, deprivation of the right to fair use is 
tantamount to deprivation of the Internet itself. Thus, “[d]epriving a 
person of Internet access,” even if for only ten-to-fourteen days, is 
“an extreme measure impacting fundamental freedoms of speech and 
association.”118 With the benefit of twenty-years of hindsight, the 
DMCA’s enablement of the private disregard of fair use, and the 
removal of the plaintiff’s duty to prove the existence of a valid 
copyright in the first place undermine the very policy behind 
copyright itself – to promote the free and open exchange of ideas.119  
Recognizing the vital public interest in free speech, the court in 
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., for instance, held that, “while authors 
are undoubtedly important intended beneficiaries of copyright, the 
ultimate primary intended beneficiary is the public, whose access to 
knowledge copyright seeks to advance …. ”120 Because copyright 
exists for the public benefit, we must evaluate the DMCA based on 
how well it furthers this ultimate purpose.121 The overbroad takedown 
of lawful speech implicates the Constitution and the right to make, 
seek, and receive ideas, information, and expression. This is why, in 
Stanley v. Georgia, the Supreme Court held that the right to seek and 
obtain information and speech is “fundamental to our free society.”122  
Similarly, Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union held that 
expression on the Internet is entitled to the same First Amendment 
protection as offline speech.123 Not only is Internet speech 
constitutionally protected, but the Internet is central to disseminating 
speech. Therefore, rules restricting Internet speech and fair use merit 
closer scrutiny. The Reno court observed that the Internet is “the most 
participatory form of mass speech yet developed.”124  
At other times, the Supreme Court has declared similar values. 
The right to receive information, whether on the Internet or not, relies 
on the fundamental need to develop a person’s ability to exercise their 
right to make meaningful and contributory expression in various 
facets of society.125 Because there is no legally recognized right to 
force private OSPs to post any particular content, a victim of an 
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improper DMCA takedown cannot obtain a court order, such as a 
temporary restraining order that compels the OSP to keep online 
content subject to an abusive takedown demand. 
Derogating these principles, the DMCA allows speech to be 
forced down on demand for ten-to-fourteen days based on mere 
allegation and without the claimant having to carry any burden of 
proof or even having to establish the existence of a valid copyright in 
the first place. The DMCA’s imbalance in favor of the putative 
copyright holder “harm[s] the government’s interest in promoting the 
generation and dissemination of knowledge and culture.”126  
Ironically, the DMCA bias against users is self-defeating. By 
depriving users of key protections against automatic takedowns, the 
DMCA undermines the purpose for which it was created – ultimately, 
to promote the dissemination of speech, ideas, and commerce by 
encouraging the growth of a vital medium of communication, the 
Internet. Instead, “[t]he law’s shield for service providers becomes, 
paradoxically, a sword against the public, which depends upon these 
providers as platforms for speech.”127 A “heckler’s veto” phenomena 
emerges, where any putative copyright claimant who merely dislikes 
a post can disable it arbitrarily via a DMCA takedown notice.128  
In view of this widespread abuse, the DMCA should be amended 
to give speech the benefit of the doubt. This would bring the DMCA 
into compliance with centuries of American jurisprudence. “First 
Amendment standards,” the Supreme Court reasons, “must give the 
benefit of any doubt to protecting rather than stifling speech.”129 On a 
similar note, the Supreme Court, in Virginia v. Hicks, recognized that 
failure to extend offline protections to online copyright infringement 
allegations would inevitably harm society: “Many persons, rather than 
undertake the considerable burden (and sometimes risk) of 
vindicating their rights through case-by-case litigation, will choose 
simply to abstain from protected speech – harming not only 
themselves but society as a whole, which is deprived of an 
uninhibited marketplace of ideas.”130 This is consistent with the High 
Court’s previous observation that “the censor’s determination” 
amounts to a one-sided and often self-serving appraisal of 
infringement. This unilateral determination regarding whether 
material stays up or goes down, the Court recognized, “may in 
practice be final.”131  
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Our legal system has long recognized the fundamental 
procedural right to notice and an opportunity to be heard before 
speech is muzzled, whether by a DMCA takedown or any other 
means.132  Nowhere else in the law of the United States are such basic 
procedural safeguards systematically eliminated. Offline, prior 
restraints are heavily disfavored and have been for well over a 
hundred years.133 Prior restraints are seldom appropriate absent a clear 
showing of irreparable harm, which is rare in the copyright context, 
where, for instance, money damages may be sufficient, such as from 
an implied license or judicially-imposed reasonable royalty.134  
Because takedowns occur when the issue of infringement is far 
from clear-cut, the benefit of the doubt should go to speech. A pro-
speech default rule accords with long-standing policy in favor of 
speech and against prior restraints.135 Such reform would give the 
benefit of the doubt to fair use and squares with the legal policy of 
erring on the side of protecting speech.136  
CONCLUSION 
To protect users’ interests in the indispensable defense of fair 
use, Congress should amend § 512 of the DMCA to eliminate the 
automatic and mandatory ten-to-fourteen-day takedown period if the 
target responds with a good faith affidavit of non-infringement. If the 
user does not respond, then the material should come down after a 
specified amount of time. The simple adjustments posited in this 
article will not harm copyright but will protect fair use while leaving 
intact OSPs’ Safe Harbor immunity. In so doing, underlying policies 
common to both the DMCA and copyright’s fair use doctrine – to 
provide for the dissemination of ideas and speech – will be 
strengthened for the public’s benefit. 
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